







Apostasy in Level of Automation Modelling: Four Studies on the Road to Disillusionment


Greg A. Jamieson & Gyrd Skraaning Jr.





Variable	SS Effect	df Effect	MS Effect	SS Error	df Error	MS Error	F	p
OPAS task performance	1972.80	1.00	1972.80	3191.87	34.00	93.88	21.01	0.00
Process Expert rated task performance	2.92	1.00	2.92	11.47	34.00	0.34	8.66	0.01
Total communications per min	20.75	1.00	20.75	11.50	34.00	0.34	61.38	0.00
Self-rated period workload	1.21	1.00	1.21	15.54	34.00	0.46	2.65	0.11
Self-rated task performance	0.09	1.00	0.09	11.82	34.00	0.35	0.25	0.62
Self-rated situation awareness	0.22	1.00	0.22	16.53	34.00	0.49	0.46	0.50
Self-rated teamwork	0.06	1.00	0.06	15.02	34.00	0.44	0.13	0.73
Self-rated necessary of communication	0.15	1.00	0.15	15.28	34.00	0.45	0.34	0.56
Self-rated communication demand	0.08	1.00	0.08	20.30	34.00	0.60	0.13	0.72
Self-rated reliability of communication	0.14	1.00	0.14	7.24	34.00	0.21	0.65	0.42
Self-rated scenario workload	0.02	1.00	0.02	11.34	34.00	0.33	0.07	0.80







The Explorative LOA Study – HAMBO 2009



The LOA Classification Study – NORS 1998



1st Procedure Automation Experiment – FITNESS 2002



2nd Procedure Automation Experiment – HAMBO 2002

Acknowledgements

- Principal investigators in original studies
 - Ann Britt Skjerve
 - Maren Helene Rø Eitrheim
 - Gisle Andresen
- Process experts, developers, laboratory technicians, managers and others

Our contributions

- Statistical reanalysis
 - verify prior results
 - extract new findings
 - discover patterns across studies
- Reinterpretation of results
 - per study and across studies
- Connected results to recent literature

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The Explorative LOA Study – HAMBO 2009



The LOA Classification Study – NORS 1998




1st Procedure Automation Experiment – FITNESS 2002



2nd Procedure Automation Experiment – HAMBO 2002

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HAMMLAB 2009 – HAMBO Simulator



11

Complicated experiment

- Experimental manipulations
 - transparency of Automation **(presented at HFC in 2014)**
 - multi-unit staffing
 - overview displays
 - scenario complexity
- Explorative investigation
 - impact of high LOA on OOTLUF


Run	Automation interface	Multi-unit staffing	Overview display	Easy scenario period	Difficult scenario period
1	non-transparent	traditional	present		
2	non-transparent	traditional	futuristic		
3	transparent	traditional	futuristic		
4	transparent	traditional	present		
5	non-transparent	untraditional	present		
6	non-transparent	untraditional	futuristic		
7	transparent	untraditional	futuristic		
8	transparent	untraditional	present		

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Background

- When automatic systems are given more authority, intelligence and autonomy
 - humans are placed outside the control loop
 - but still expected to perform important functions, e.g. taking over manually in the event of system failures
- OOTLUF can be seen a consequence of increasing LOA

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High LOA in the 2009 experiment

- Automation
 - executed process control tasks to bring the plant from cold start-up to 50% reactor power
 - performed basic monitoring of process deviations in normal system states
- Operators
 - supported automation when system failures occurred
 - were unfamiliar with automation that took active control of the whole plant

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High LOA will produce
OOTL events



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Multi-stage filtration

All human performance data

Possible OOTL events

Probable OOTL events




True OOTL events

17

OOTL indicators

- Loss of Situation Awareness
- Degraded Task Performance
- Out-of-the-loop buttons
- Video and simulator logs
- Debriefing interviews




Instruction for PROCESS EXPERT:
A striped GREEN button indicates the operator is IN-the-loop. Process Expert should unpress the green button when the crew become out-of-the-loop.

An RED button indicates the operator is OUT-of-the-loop. Process Expert should press the red button when the crew return back in-the-loop.

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Searching for outliers




19

SME filtering of possible OOTL events

Scenario period	SCN	RUN	CREW	SUI	OPAS-Z	OPAS evaluation	PO-Z	PO evaluation	Experimental leader log	Process expert 1 log	Process expert 2 log	Filtering criteria
Easy	1	28	4	off	-0,84	Low score, but congruency between crews	-1,70	Remarkable low score	04:59 WM reminds MO that he has to take care of the turbine side as well as the reactor side			OPAS + PO
Easy	3	71	9	on	-1,48	Remarkable low score	1,29		MO and WM focused on 314, which has no relevance in this scenario. They're not detecting incoming alarms. Manual mode most of the period.	Spend 25 min on a system that has no relevance in the scenario.	A textbook example of what happens when both SS and the operator are focused on one problem, and losing the overview of the process completely. It went totally wrong.	OPAS + SUI + logs
Easy	6	3	1	off	-0,52	Remarkable low score	-3,05	Remarkable low score	Navigation and technical questions - the crew got assistance from PE.	Did not manage to find appropriate picture for starting a redundant pump. The automation was put in manual for a long period (after break?).		OPAS + PO
Difficult	5	32	4	on	-2,25	Remarkable low score	0,13		The operators did not detect the reason for failures > reactor scram and turbine trip	Do not detect that condensate pump stopped - reactor scram, turbine trip.		OPAS + SUI + logs
Difficult	6	18	3	off	-1,66	Low score, but congruency between crews	-1,70	Remarkable low score	Some navigation/process questions to PE. Manual operation in the last part of period 1. Did not get the last error according to spec.	Detected increased flow, but did not solve the problem with air leakage to the condenser.		OPAS + PO
Difficult	6	41	6	on	-1,66	Low score, but congruency between crews	1,58		Are operators aware of automation actions? Operators are working as they would do at home, not aware of the automation progress	Reactor scram affects handling of error in the second period.	Tend to choose manual operation quite often. Working slowly and lack overview of the plant.	OPAS + SUI + logs
Difficult	7	16	2	off	-1,45	Remarkable low score	-1,99	Remarkable low score	AO in plant B the whole scenario, WM in plant B most of the time. MO navigation question.			OPAS + PO
Difficult	8	22	3	off	-1,67	Remarkable low score	-0,83		Manual operation during period 2. AO in plant B during the whole scenario	Did not detect bypass of preheaters.		OPAS + logs


20

17 probable OOTL events identified



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SME analysis of 17 probable OOTL events



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Reactions



- 2010 Out-of-the-loop performance 2009 - HAMMLAB
- 2010 Coping with Automation 2009 - HAMMLAB
- 2005 Extended Teamwork 2004 - HAMMLAB
- 2002 Procedure Automation 2002 - HAMMLAB
- 2001 Procedure Automation 2001 - FITNESS
- 2001 Human-Centered Automation 2001 - HAMMLAB
- 2000 Human-Centered Automation 2000 - HAMMLAB
- 1998 Types of Automation 1998 - HAMMLAB
- 1997 Trust in Automation 1997 - HAMMLAB





The Explorative LOA Study – HAMBO 2009



The LOA Classification Study – NORS 1998



1st Procedure Automation Experiment – FITNESS 2002



2nd Procedure Automation Experiment – HAMBO 2002

HAMMLAB 1998 – NORS Simulator




Partly funded by IPSN (IRSN), France

Fundamental assumption behind the experiment

- LOA and taskwork are deeply entangled in real life
- Experimental separation of LOA and task effects creates artificial results
- LOA becomes an abstraction rather than a real phenomenon



Methodological approach






A double-edged sword

- Prioritized ecological over internal validity
- LOA manipulations were deliberately confounded with scenario effects
- Challenging to interpret experimental effects
- Reanalysis produced ambiguous results

Scenario	Scenario type	Level of automation	Scenario Complexity
1	Diagnostic	High	High
2	Diagnostic	Low	Low
3	Diagnostic	Low	High
4	Diagnostic	High	Low
5	Procedural	High	Medium
6	Procedural	Low	Medium



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Substantiation of LOA classifications

- Six realistic test scenarios developed and classified by a team of SMEs
 - two process experts and a nuclear engineer
 - could they be wrong?
- We tried to verify their classifications or reclassify based on technically specific LOA criteria
- To improve the interpretability of the experiment



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

Scenario 4

IPSN Scenario 4. Faulty Turbine and Reactor Coolant Controllers, combined with erroneous start of dilution program.

Operating devices in the YZ- Plant protection system

YZ21	YZ41
YZ22	YZ42
YZ23	
YZ24	YZ51
YZ25	YZ52
YZ26	
YZ27	YZ62
	YZ63
YZ31	YZ64
YZ32	YZ65
YZ33	
YZ34	YZ81
YZ35	
YZ36	

Initial state of Reactor and turbine load controllers



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Automatic devices in NORS

- **Interlocks** – prevent actions from being carried out in safety critical situations
- **Controllers** – regulate plant components (e.g. power level, temperature, pressure)
- **Limitations** – ensure that predefined operating values are not exceeded
- **Protections** – ensure that predefined safety critical values are not exceeded
- **Programs** – switch a group of components on or off in predefined sequences

Available information in 6 scenarios

	Number of		Accumulated duration
	involved	active	
Interlocks			
Controllers	✓	✓	✓
Limitations			
Protections	✓	✓	✓
Programs	✓	✓	✓
Manual replacements	✓		✓

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The screenshot shows an Excel spreadsheet with the following data tables:

Scenario	Number of involved programs	Number of operating programs	Accumulated program operating duration	Accumulated program supervising duration
1	16	15	53.7	141.5
2	16	13	14.3	160.1
3	7	1	6.9	78.5
4	16	5	40.2	153.5
5	20	6	44.8	195.2
6	17	8	65.1	142.3

Scenario	Number of involved controllers	Number of operating controllers	Accumulated controller operating duration	Accumulated controller supervising duration
1	22	20	147.6	82.4
2	22	17	92.2	120.2
3	15	11	86.3	63.3
4	21	19	161.6	66.8
5	22	15	158.9	80.9
6	22	19	169.8	87

Scenario	Number of involved protections	Number of operating protections	Accumulated protection operating durations	Accumulated protection supervising durations
1	7	7	0.8	33.7
2	7	5	1	48.5
3	3	0	0	36.3
4	7	1	0.2	84.5
5	7	0	0	84.7
6	7	1	0.3	75.5

Scenario	Manual replacement of programs	Manual replacement of program duration	Manual replacement of controllers	Manual replacement of controller duration
1	0	0	0	0
2	0	0	0	0
3	0	0	4	33.4
4	1	1.5	3	27.8
5	2	4	5	28.6
6	0	0	2	11.6

Scenario	Auto active (sec)	Sum of devices	Sum operating devices	Duratin of manual effort	LOA
1	460	45	42	0	42
2	436	45	35	0	35
3	271	25	12	33.4	8
4	507	44	25	29.3	21
5	565	49	21	32.6	14
6	540	46	28	11.6	26

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Examples of tested LOA indexes

- Σa_i (controller, protection and automatic program activities) - Σb_i (manual replacements)
- Accumulated duration of [controller, protection and automatic program activities] – accumulated duration of manual efforts
- Combinations of duration and frequency indicators
- Automation activity without taking manual replacements into account
- Separate indexes for controllers, protections and automatic programs

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Outcome

- Many disparate calculations
- Inability to match calculations to original SME assessment
- Almost any LOA classification of scenario was possible
- Pessimistic interpretation
 - LOA and taskwork seem inseparable in real life
 - LOA classification of complex taskwork appears problematic
 - is LOA an abstraction without root in reality?

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
From country cruising to Rally Dakar



>



Level (or degree) of automation



Adapted from Wickens et al. (2010) by Onnasch et al. (2014)³⁹

Human Performance Consequences of Stages and Levels of Automation: An Integrated Meta-Analysis

Linda Onnasch, Technische Universität Berlin, Berlin, Germany,
Christopher D. Wickens, Alion Science and Technology, McLean, Virginia,
USA, Huiyang Li, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA, and
Dietrich Manzey, Technische Universität Berlin, Berlin, Germany

HUMAN FACTORS

Vol. 56, No. 3, May 2014, pp. 476–488

DOI: 10.1177/0018720813501549

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TABLE 1: Kendall's Tau for the Single Studies on the Six Metavariables With Resulting Overall Kendall's Tau and Statistics of One-Tailed t Tests

Study	Routine Primary Task Performance (TP)	Return-to-Manual Primary TP	Routine Secondary TP	Return-to-Manual Secondary TP	Subjective Workload	Situation Awareness
Calhoun et al. (2009)	-.816		0			0
Crocoll & Coury (1990)	.707					
Cummings & Mitchell (2007)	0					0
Endsley & Kaber (1999)	.637	.025			.804	.597
Endsley & Kiris (1995)		-.837			0	-.837
Kaber & Endsley (2004)	.6	0			-.598	.258
Kaber et al. (2000)	.316	-.408			-.775	-.632
Li et al. (in preparation)	1				-1	-1
Lorenz et al. (2002a)	.333	-.333	0	0	0	
Lorenz et al. (2002b)	.816	.333				
Manzey et al. (2012)	.913	-.816	.913		-.913	-.707
Metzger & Parasuraman (2005)	0	0	0	0	0	0
Reichenbach et al. (2011)	1	-1	0	0	0	0
Röttger et al. (2009)	.816		0		-1	
Rovira et al. (2007)	.837		.707		-.333	
Sarter & Schroeder (2001)	1					
Sethumadhavan (2009)			.707			-.913
Wright & Kaber (2005)	0				.913	
Overall τ	.509	-.337	.291	0	-.242	-.294
t-crit	1.341	-1.397	1.415		-1.363	-1.372
t	4.027	-2.176	2.024		-1.284	-1.809
p	.0005*	.031*	.042*		.056	.049*

- clear automation benefit for routine performance with increasing DOA
- similar but weaker pattern for workload
- negative impact of higher DOA on failure system performance and SA

HUMAN FACTORS
 Vol. 56, No. 3, May 2014, pp. 476-488
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The Explorative LOA Study – HAMBO 2009



The LOA Classification Study – NORS 1998



1st Procedure Automation Experiment – FITNESS 2002




2nd Procedure Automation Experiment – HAMBO 2002




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Degree of procedure automation




- Profiling based on
 - information-processing perspective (Parasuraman et al., 2000)
 - COPS capability analysis (IEEE Std. 1786-2011)




45

Statistical findings

- **Routine performance** more efficient with automated procedures
 $F(2,10) = 6.80, p < 0.014$
- LOA had no effect on **failure performance**, **situation awareness**, or **workload**



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


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Possible explanations

- Participants were mostly engineers rather than licensed operators
- Participants worked individually; not in crews
- Participants not required to use the COPS
- “to be able to measure the effect of procedure automation, more sensitive and valid measures are required” (HWR-707, p. 19)

Explained by the 'a' threshold?



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The Explorative LOA Study – HAMBO 2009



The LOA Classification Study – NORS 1998



1st Procedure Automation Experiment – FITNESS 2002



2nd Procedure Automation Experiment – HAMBO 2002


50

HAMMLAB 2002 – HAMBO simulator



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Degree of procedure automation



- Profiling based on
 - information-processing perspective (Parasuraman et al., 2000)
 - COPS capability analysis (IEEE Std. 1786-2011)

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COPMA procedure system

Navigation flowchart

Groups of procedure steps

The step must be executed manually

Run-procedure button

Procedure step

Procedure step completed button (only manual)

Control buttons (only manual)

Freeze-procedure button

Interface Content:

Forsmark 3 PROV AV SNABBSTOPPSVENTIL OCH YTTRE SKALVENTIL DT-3 354 Utgåva X

SFKV PL AC: ÅTÖÄRD Låg automatiserad SKON

PROVGRUPP A2

Sekvenslista: Kontrollera att samtliga signalpöpor för 354 är släckta


001	354A	354KA701-KA705 532 V grupp A1-A5 ur funktion är släckta.	Run-procedure
002	354B	354KB701-KB705 532 V grupp B1-B5 ur funktion är släckta.	Run-procedure
003	354C	354KC701-KC704 532 V grupp C1-C4 ur funktion är släckta.	Run-procedure
004	354D	354KD701-KD704 532 V grupp D1-D4 ur funktion är släckta.	Run-procedure
005	354A	Läs upp nyckelförening snabbstoppgrupp A2.	Run-procedure
006	354A	Stäng 354 VA22.	Run-procedure
007	354A	Kontrollera att 354 VA22 är stängd.	Run-procedure
008	354A	Kontrollera att 354KA702 532 V grupp A2 ur funktion tänds.	Run-procedure
009	354A	Öppna 354 VA2 i ca 2 s och stäng därefter.	Run-procedure
010	354A	Kontrollera att 354 VA2 öppnat och därefter stängts.	Run-procedure
011	354A	Öppna 354 VA202 genom att trycka in öppningsknappen i minst 15 s.	Run-procedure

(Kortare tid kan leda till att sturstavarna för gruppen skävs in en bit vid skävens 014)


Avslut procedur

Avslut procedur

53



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
The 2nd Procedure
Automation Experiment

Support for lumberjack model



Out-of-the-loop performance of automation

Direction of effect




$F(3, 63) = 24.669, p = 0.001$
 $\eta^2 = 0.28$ (effect size)

Interpreted support



Higher scores mean less experienced difficulty with the procedure execution



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
58

Possible explanations

- Critique
 - inflated error term due to scenario variation
 - unfamiliar SA measure (IPAQ)
- Response
 - high degree of similarity in methods to other HAMMLAB experiments that demonstrated anticipated effects
 - IPAQ sensitive to scenario manipulations; works well in HAMMLAB experiment on teamwork and task management (HWR-704)

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Possible Explanations



60

TABLE 1: Kendall's Tau for the Single Studies on the Six Metavariables With Resulting Overall Kendall's Tau and Statistics of One-Tailed t Tests

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Lorenz et al. (2002b)	.816	-.333				
Manzey et al. (2012)	.913	-.816	.913		-.913	.707
Metzger & Parasuraman (2005)	0	0	0	0	0	0
Reichenbach et al. (2011)	1	-1	0	0	0	0
Röttger et al. (2009)	.816		0		-1	
Rovira et al. (2007)	.837		.707		-.333	
Sarter & Schroeder (2001)	1					
Sethumadhavan (2009)			.707			-.913
Wright & Kaber (2005)	0				.913	
Overall τ	.509	-.337	.291	0	-.242	-.294
t-crit	1.341	-1.397	1.415		-1.363	-1.372
t	4.027	-2.176	2.024		-1.284	-1.809
p	.0005*	.031*	.042*		.056	.049*

- clear automation benefit for routine performance with increasing DOA,
- similar but weaker pattern for workload
- **Complex work settings**
 - professional operators
 - high fidelity simulators
 - realistic scenarios
- negative impact of higher DOA on failure system performance and SA.

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Study	Experiment Characteristics	Routine Primary Task Performance	Return-to-Manual Primary Task Performance	Routine Secondary Task Performance	Return-to-Manual Secondary Task perform	Subjective Workload	SA
Calhoun et al. (2009)	Military personnel (non-SME); Commercial simulator; complex scenarios	-.816		0			0
Cummings & Mitchell (2007)	Active-duty military personnel; laboratory simulator; futuristic scenarios	0					0
Metzger & Parasuraman (2005)	En route controllers; medium fidelity task simulator; multi-task scenarios	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sarter & Schroeder (2001)	Commercial aircraft pilots; Full-scope simulator; Complex scenarios	1					
1st Procedure Automation Experiment	Licensed NPP operators; Full- scope simulator; Complex scenarios	1	0			0	0
2nd Procedure Automation Experiment	Licensed NPP operators; Full- scope simulator; Complex scenarios	0				0	1




Operational Experience with LOA



The 5 levels of driving automation

For on-road vehicles

		Human driver	Automated system		
		Steering and acceleration/deceleration	Monitoring of driving environment	Fallback when automation fails	Automated system is in control
Human driver monitors the road	0 NO AUTOMATION				N/A
	1 DRIVER ASSISTANCE				SOME DRIVING MODES
	2 PARTIAL AUTOMATION				SOME DRIVING MODES
Automated driving system monitors the road	3 CONDITIONAL AUTOMATION				SOME DRIVING MODES
	4 HIGH AUTOMATION				SOME DRIVING MODES
	5 FULL AUTOMATION				



A consistent pattern of results

- Explorative studies
 - anticipated OOTL performance degradations under high LOA were absent
 - technically specific LOA classification of realistic test scenarios produced arbitrary results
- Findings from two controlled LOA experiments were inconsistent with the lumberjack model
 - compared to similar studies from complex work settings in other domains
 - compared to operational experiences with LOA applications

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Practical implications



- Technical basis of LOA predictions in complex work settings seems weaker than anticipated
- Be critical when applying established LOA frameworks
- LOA modeling could mislead designers and result in unsafe human-machine systems
- Ineffective LOA regimes may undermine the legitimacy of human factors design guidance

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