

**FORSVARET**

*Something was missing...*

- We could tell the story, but it was not sufficient to:
  - c) Issue statements on what must/can be done to prevent similar events in the future

The slide features a graphic of four black puzzle pieces arranged in a 2x2 square, with one piece missing from the top-right position, symbolizing an incomplete picture or a missing piece of information.

Solution

DNV·GL



MARITIME

## Safety culture in the Navy, including support elements and operational management

DNV GL ©
SAFER, SMARTER, GREENER

### Scope

 <b>Submarine</b>	 <b>Coastal FPB</b>	 <b>Mine Clearance</b>
 <b>Logistic and support elements</b>	 <b>Frigate</b>	 <b>Staff and shorebased organizations</b>

#### Survey

502 respondents of approx. 1000 invited

Navy ships and Navy leadership

!

#### Interview

160 persons, 84 interviews

Leadership, staff, ship commanders, officers, enlisted, crew



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*Safety culture survey results - level of maturity per dimension*

Level of maturity	Competence & manning	Cooperation & involvement	Awareness	Conflict of interests	Incentives	Follow-up	Robustness	Organizational learning
Generative								
Proactive								
Calculating								
Reactive								
Pathological								


  


Generative Culture	A just, learning, flexible, adaptive, prepared and informed culture that strives for resilience <i>Safety is something we make, not something we have</i>
Proactive Culture	Aware of latent failures and situations and seeks to eliminate or reduce attached risks. <i>Safety leadership and values drive continuous improvements</i>
Calculating Culture	Provides systems to handle safety issues, prone to compliance. Collects data - but does not always use them. <i>We have systems in place to manage all hazards, and we can document compliance</i>
Reactive Culture	Will respond to and make changes everytime an accident occurs. <i>Safety is important, we do a lot every time we have an accident</i>
Pathological Culture	Accidents is an "accepted" part of day to day business. Resist change, maintaining façade. <i>Who cares if we're not caught. BTW, anyone got a fittingscape goat?</i>

Scale of safety culture maturity, ref P. Hudson


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
*What did it tell us?*






Based on Jens Rasmussen's "Drift into failure"





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*Safety culture effect*


**In 2019 Navy Admiral Rune Andersen established new areas of focus**

- Safety Culture; it's a leadership responsibility
- Structure and availability of documentation
- Personnel competence classification and training system
- Technical safety
- Deficiency management for an informed and learning organization

**Rullar ut tiltak for å unngå nye ulykker i Marinen**

Marinen meiner dei nå veit kvifor KNM «Helge Ingstad» kolliderte, og set inn ei rekke tiltak for å unngå nye ulykker.

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HAR OVERSIKT: Flaggkommandør Rune Andersen er sjef for Marinen, og seier det var ein kjede av faktorar som førte til kollisjonen i Hjeltefjorden. Foto: Tor Høvik

Source: Bergens Tidende (Newspaper), September 11, 2019



*Thank you*

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