

# Transition To Remote Tower Operations And The Human Element

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
## PROGRAMME OVERVIEW

- Strategic decision in the Avinor Group to implement Remote Tower at 15 airports. Varying in size from Røst to Bodø
- Staged implementation starting operations at AP-1 in Q3-2018 – ending with AP-15 at the end of 2020
- Initial operation in a Contingency RTC with 5 workstations and a supervisor
- Parallell construction of a Main RTC with 16 workstations – planned completion in 2019
- Overall Programme Cost: 130 million EUR
- Technology: 60 million EUR
- In-house deliverables: 70 million EUR

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# TECHNOLOGY



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
# Where are we coming from?



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## Remote Tower Module



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## Remote Tower Center



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## Modes of Operation

- Single One RTM serves one airport
- Sequential One RTM serve more than one airport in sequence i.e. a defined period between airports being served
- Multiple/multi One RTM serves more than one aerodrome simultaneously

## Understanding the Change to RTS



## Change in HMI and Procedures

The screenshot displays a flight display interface. At the top, it shows flight information for **WIF 741**. Below this, a prominent red banner reads **RUNWAY BLOCKED**. The interface lists various flight paths and their statuses, including **CSA97A** and **CSA02B**. The bottom part of the display shows a grid of flight data with columns for flight ID, status, and other parameters.

DH8A	M	N8268	1474							
<b>WIF 741</b>										
ENRM		1507		7.0		NWS	EST10	EST4		R35
ENNM		1517	23	4.5		1515	157	19	18	21004
										VTC
						RVK	NWS			21/5

DH8A	M	N8268								
<b>WIF 741</b>										
ENNM		1540	38	120		RNV-PRE			118.6	R25
ENVA		1558	4506	F100					069%	Q1024

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## BUILDING THE SAFETY CASE

- Operational Concept for Single RT operations developed
- Concept was base for a functional hazard identification work shop. Goal:
  - ✓ Identify and assess hazards;
  - ✓ Establish safety objectives for the RT concept
- The Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA) was brought further to a Preliminary System Safety Assessment (PSSA). Goal:
  - ✓ Establish initial safety requirements to the system as a whole (technology, procedures, people);
  - ✓ Safety requirements formed part of tender documents
- A similar process to assess human factors:
  - ✓ Work shops to establish main drivers and requirements to the system – particularly for the development of technology
  - ✓ HP Requirements formed part of tender documents

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## MAIN AREAS OF THE HUMAN PERFORMANCE CASE

1. Roles and responsibilities
  - a) Operational methods
  - b) Tasks
2. Human and systems
  - a) Task distribution (human/system)
  - b) System performance
  - c) Human Machine Interface
3. Team and team communication
  - a) Team
  - b) Task distribution between teammembers
  - c) Team communication
4. Working environment
  - a) Design of controller working position
  - b) Physical working environment
5. Organisation and staffing
  - a) Accept and job satisfaction
  - b) Competency requirements
6. Training
  - a) Training plans

## TRANSITION INTO OPERATION

- **Acceptance:**

*The proposed solution is acceptable to affected human actors*

- ✓ *Changes in roles and responsibilities*
- ✓ *Impact of changes on job-satisfaction*

- **Competency**

*Changes in competence requirements are analysed*

- ✓ *Knowledge, skills and experience requirements*
- ✓ *Impact on operator licensing*
- ✓ *Possible interference between existing and new knowledge and skills*

- **Staff:**

*Changes in staffing requirements and staffing levels are identified*

- ✓ *Impact on staff levels*
- ✓ *Impact on shift organization*
- ✓ *Impact on workforce location*

- **Recruitment and Selection:**

*The impact on recruitment and selection processes has been considered*

- ✓ *Changes in operator's profiles*
- ✓ *Changes in selection criteria*

- **Training:**

*Training needs are identified for the affected human actors*

- ✓ *The content of training for each actor group*
- ✓ *The duration of training for each actor group*
- ✓ *The required types of training (classroom, simulator, OJT)*

## HIGH LEVEL SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS

- Visual detection capability (20/20 vision or visual acuity 1.0)
- Equal or better situational awareness compared to a regular TWR (PTZ, 360-IR og IR-Zoom, LRF, Information on Heads-Up-Display)
- Equal or improved level of safety
- Requirements stemming from:
  - SES and SESAR
  - ICAO Doc 4444 – Procedures for Air Navigation Services Air Traffic Management
  - ICAO Doc 8964 (FAA ATCS MED) – Manual of Civil Aviation Medicine



## To Conclude

- Remote Towers is more than an equipment change
- Technology is important but not the only enabler to make operations a success
- The consideration of the human is key to make this a success for safety and business expectations